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Mind, language, and subjectivity : minimal content and the theory of thought

서명/저자: Mind, language, and subjectivity : minimal content and the theory of thought / Nicholas Georgalis

내용주기: 완전내용Cover; Title; Copyright; Contents; Preface; 1 Minimal Content and Intentionality; 1.1 Introduction; 1.2 Privileged Access and Minimal Content; 1.3 Intentional States and Minimal Content; 1.4 Illustrative Applications of the Concepts; 1.5 Further Development of Some of the Fundamental Ideas Presented; 1.6 The Fundamental Intentional State; 2 More on Minimal Content and Related Issues; 2.1 Introduction; 2.2 Some General Remarks on Methodology; 2.3 So What, Then, Is Minimal Content?; 2.4 Yet Another Illustration of the Aptness of the Concept of Minimal Content; 2.5 Ontological Issues Set Aside.

내용주기: 완전내용2.6 Constituting and Grasping Minimal Content: Fregean, Cartesian, and Searlean Comparisons3 Thinking Differently About Thought and Language; 3.1 Introduction; 3.2 Standard Meaning and Standard Reference; 3.3 A New Theory of Thought; 3.4 The Fundamental Difference in the Current Theory From Alternatives; 4 The Superiority of the New Theory to Frege's; 4.1 Introduction; 4.2 Frege's Theory of Thought; 4.3 The Two Theories Compared; 4.4 The Object of Awareness; 4.5 The Perplexing Case of Dr. Lauben; 4.6 More Problems for Frege's Theory.

내용주기: 완전내용4.7 Failure of Frege's Stipulation Strategy and a Fundamental Problem for the Concept of Sense: Standard Meaning Prevails4.8 More on Different Language and Different Thought Problems; 4.9 Troubles for Frege's Discussion of 'I'; 4.10 Concluding Contrasts and Summary of the New Theory; 5 Kripke's Puzzle About Belief Solved; 5.1 Introduction; 5.2 Contrasting the Orthodox View of Belief with the New Theory; 5.3 Paderewski Puzzle; 5.4 'London'/'Londres' Puzzle; 5.5 Summary; 6 Use, Idiolect, and Statement Made; 6.1 Introduction; 6.2 Use and Idiolects; 6.3 Statement Made; 7 Speaker's Referent.

내용주기: 완전내용7.1 Introduction7.2 A Subjective Theory of Speaker's Referent; 7.3 Kripke's Distinction: Speaker's Reference/Semantic Reference; 7.4 Residual Difficulty for the Subjective Theory of Speaker's Referent Resolved; 8 Speaker's Referent and the Referential/Attributive Distinction; 8.1 Introduction; 8.2 The Phenomenon at Issue in Alleged Referential Uses; 8.3 The Subjective Theory of Speaker's Referent Applied to the Phenomenon; 8.4 Critique of Referential/Attributive Use of Definite Descriptions; 8.5 The Circle of "Referential Use" and Statement Made; 9 Proper Names; 9.1 Introduction.

내용주기: 완전내용9.2 Searle's 1958 Theory of Proper Names9.3 Did Kripke Refute Searle's Theory of Proper Names?; 9.4 Proper Names and Possible Worlds; 9.5 The New Theory Provides a Corrective to a Remaining Problem; 9.6 Brief Summary; 10 Solutions to Classic Problems; 10.1 Introduction; 10.2 Substitution in Propositional Attitudes; 10.3 Frege's Puzzle; 10.4 More on Substitution and Transparent/Opaque Reading; 10.5 Two Remaining Puzzles: True Negative Existentials and Empty Names; 10.6 Brief Summary; 11 Securing Determinate Meaning-Part I: Against Kripkenstein; 11.1 Introduction.

초록/해제: 요약 :In this monograph Nicholas Georgalis further develops his important work on minimal content, recasting and providing novel solutions to several of the fundamental problems faced by philosophers of language. His theory defends and explicates the importance of 'thought-tokens' and minimal content and their many-to-one relation to linguistic meaning, challenging both 'externalist' accounts of thought and the solutions to philosophical problems of language they inspire. The concepts of idiolect, use, and statement made are critically discussed, and a classification of kinds of utterances is develo.